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SPATIAL INFORMATION AND DIAGRAMS
Meghan Ertl-Bendickson
[This paper received the 2011 Jakob Laub Prize in Philosophy.]
Introduction
In recent times, it has become undesirable to use diagrams
in logical proofs. Logical proofs, even in geometry, are ideally
purely formal representations. Recent experiments by David
Kirshner and David Landy, however, have shown that the way in
which we physically arrange symbols on a page when we write a
formula affects whether or not we compute it correctly.
Specifically, we normally place multiplied (or divided) terms
closer together than added (or subtracted) terms – following the
order of operations. The operations which are supposed to be
performed first are placed physically closer together than those
which are done later (I shall refer to this as the ―Rule of Spacing‖).
When formula are written inconsistent with this rule, people make
more computational errors. Landy claims that this implies, through
his ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis and his ―syntax‖ hypothesis, that
there are diagrammatic elements to our formal representations. I
argue that even if these spatial relations are diagrammatic, it is not
a problem for logic the way using a conventional diagram would
be. However, while I agree that these results are very important
and need to be discussed, I argue that these spatial relationships are
not actually diagrammatic.
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Why Diagrams are Problematic for Logic and Math
Before we can examine Kirshner and Landy's results, we
need to understand some background information about diagrams
and why, exactly, it is no longer considered acceptable to use them
in logical proofs. Diagrams were originally developed, in the times
of Ancient Greece, for use in cartography and to find ways to
accurately measure spaces and distances. This means that the first
diagrams were meant to describe contingent, extensional properties
of the real world. ―Geometry as a discipline originated in the need
to solve problems concerned with distances and areas in surveying
and cartography. Its subject matter was therefore the physical
features of the world, and the logical relationship its conclusions
bore to these features was therefore contingent, akin to that of any
physical theory.‖ 1 They were used to deal with specific instances
in space and time, for instance mapping a real landscape in a
particular area. Geometry developed out of these issues.
However, it has since become something quite different. A
critical change came when Descartes presented to us a way to
describe geometric diagrams algebraically, allowing us to convert
diagrams into formal representations.2 This was beneficial to the
study of geometry in a number of ways. It allowed geometry to
directly profit from advances made in the rest of mathematics, so
that if a new discovery were made elsewhere it could be applied to
geometry, as well. It also solved the issue, which had been
recognized for many, many years, that relying too completely on a
diagram can cause error solely because the actual diagrams we
1

Greaves, Mark. 2002. The philosophical status of diagrams. (Stanford, Calif:
CSLI Publications), 77
2
Ibid., 78

164

draw are fallible. No drawing of a triangle is ever going to be a
perfect triangle, so basing your calculations on a specific drawing
of a triangle can cause mistakes. Working instead with the algebra
allows us to talk about ―perfect‖ geometric shapes, without having
to worry about whether our diagrams are accurate. Finally, though,
Descartes allowed us to begin to discuss things that are not
visualizable or intuitable. Geometry was no longer restricted to the
domain of things that humans are capable of visualizing. We can
talk, now, of 5-dimensional objects, or shapes with more sides than
we can picture, etc. This final point makes it clear that geometry
had begun to move away from its original purpose – the study of
the real world and extensional, contingent spaces.3
Another shift came with the discovery of Non-Euclidean
geometry. ―After this discovery, it was unclear whether the
theorems of geometry could even be considered to be true of
objects of the world, let alone descriptive of their necessary
properties, because of the uncertainty about the world's actual
geometry.‖ 4 Now there were actual aspects of geometry that
specifically did not relate to our experience of the world. In fact,
we were now left a little uneasy about the exact nature of our
world – what kind of geometry do we actually have? We had
assumed that there was only this one type of geometry based on
rules which govern the real world. But now we could see that there
were others, which follow different rules, leaving us unsure as to
which one we actually live in. And for those types of geometry that
do not represent our world, no diagram could now be of use to us.

3
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Diagrams had at one point been essential to the study of geometry,
but since then the development of geometry itself has tended in a
direction in which diagrams can no longer be of substantive use.
Greaves discusses a number of the fundamental reasons
diagrams cannot serve a real purpose in logical proofs. The first
involves the ―requirement of indeterminacy of interpretation.‖5
Basically, diagrams inherently impose one interpretation on a
problem, but there may be others. Using solely formal
representations keeps us from becoming biased towards one
particular interpretation. The second reason is slightly more subtle
and more pertinent to our present discussion. Logicians,
mathematicians, etc have wanted very much to keep psychological
processes out of our rules of reasoning. ―...the consensus among
nineteenth-century mathematicians that proofs in any sort of
mathematics be free of any dependency on facts unique to our
particular psychology...‖6 Logic is meant to be objectively true,
independent of particular human cognition. If the rules of logic are
based on a particular human psychological process, then it
functions only for human beings, not for the objective world.
Further, if a rule of logic is based on a quirk of human cognition,
we cannot be entirely sure it is true. We want to describe the world
as it objectively is, not the world as we subjectively experience it.
The most fundamental problem for diagrams, however, has
to do with a very basic assumption of logic. A logical proof is
meant to be as broad as possible. A proof is not valid if it works
only for one particular instance on one particular day, or if it

5
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functions only for one discipline but not others. ―A single
fundamental principle has been at the center of the way that
logicians from Aristotle to Frege have structured their accounts –
namely, that the scope of a legitimate logical theory should be as
broad and general as possible...logic should not be artificially
limited in its domain of applicability, and thus it should attempt to
model whatever is common about reasoning broadly conceived,
however small that common fraction may be.‖ 7 We do not want
one system of logic for biology, one for chemistry, and another for
philosophy. Logic is meant to be a tool applied across all
disciplines to make sure that all disciplines are consistent with the
real world, not just with our own thoughts. Greaves calls this the
principle of maximal scope. Diagrams, we have seen, were
developed for a purpose in direct opposition to this. Diagrams were
meant to describe specific, contingent instances, not broad
axiomatic laws. This makes diagrams fundamentally at odds with
the aim of logic.
Visual Elements in Formal Representations
So, we can see now why it has seemed so important to
remove all aspects of diagram from our formal representations.
Diagrams are contingent, so any diagrammatic element of a formal
representation is a potential weakness to the proof. It is a point at
which we cannot be sure the proof is following the principle of
maximal scope or that it is detached from our psychological
processes. Kirshner and Landy's experiments, however, highlight
the possibility of just such an element. When we write a formula
7
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on the page, certainly that is a visual object. We may call it
'writing' instead of 'drawing', but we must admit that both are
visually processed and involve spatial relationships on the page. So
we need to clearly distinguish what makes something a formal
representation on a page, and what makes it a diagram.
Landy describes two distinctions that have been made. The
first is the concept of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic
representations. Diagrams are intrinsic representations, because the
truth I am trying to show with my diagram is intrinsic to the
diagram itself. I can draw a diagram illustrating that line A is
longer than line B by drawing one line longer than the other – the
difference in lengths of the lines is inherent to the drawing. In a
formula, however, all of the symbols involved are arbitrary. The
truth I am trying to show is extrinsic to the symbols I make – when
I say 1+1=2, nothing about any of those squiggles on the page is
inherently related to the numbers involved or the process of
addition. The drawing of the lines, on the other hand, is not
arbitrary.8
Another way of getting at this difference is to say that
diagrams are direct representations, whereas formal representations
are indirect. The formula 1+1=2 is indirect because I arrive at the
truth of the statement only through knowledge of outside laws
(what the symbol '1' means, what the rule of addition is, etc). But
in the diagram of the lines, the truth directly shown to me through
the symbols involved. I need no outside knowledge (besides
knowing the definition of 'longer') to understand what is being

8
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stated.9 What both of these theories are getting at is the idea of
arbitrariness. Formal representations are arbitrary, diagrams are
not. So in order to decide whether something is diagrammatic or
formal using these definitions, we have to ask whether it is
arbitrary, direct, and intrinsic.
Landy aims to show that there are diagrammatic elements
to formal representations by showing how the spatial relationships
between our arbitrary symbols on the page reflect the processes
going on in our calculations and also how making those
relationships differ from our norm causes us to make errors. ―…the
rule system that governs the interpretation of formal systems carry
functional spatial information – in other words, they are
diagrammatic.‖ 10 Before Landy published his papers, Kirshner11
published a paper examining the curious fact that when people
write out formulas, they place operands closer together or farther
apart in reflection of the order of operations. So, 1+2x3=7 tends to
be written 1 + 2x3 = 7, with the multiplied terms placed spatially
closer together on the page than the added terms. He wished to see
if this spatial grouping affected the way we compute, or in other
words, if these spatial relationships inform the steps we take to
solve an equation.12
To do this, Kirshner made a system called a Nonce
Notation, which is a system of arithmetic completely divorced
from any of the symbols we currently use. This Nonce Notation
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had two difference versions. The first was ―unspaced‖, the second
was ―spaced‖. The unspaced version had nothing in common with
our current notation, the spaced version was exactly the same as
unspaced, except following this Rule of Spacing we apparently
use. So the two systems were thus:
Current
a+b
a-b
axb
a/b
a^b
b

Unspaced
aAb
aSb
aMb
aDb
aEb
aRb

Spaced
a A b
a S b
aMb
aDb
aEb
aRb

In the spaced version, the operations which are supposed to be
performed first are placed closer together than those which should
be performed last, just like what we tend to do when writing in our
own notational system.13
Kirshner took a group of highschool students and first
tested them on how well they understood math in our current
notational system. Those who made minimal errors on the test then
went on to take the same type of test, except using the Nonce
Notation. The first test was unspaced, the second was spaced.
These were students who understood the laws of math and the
order of operations, so any mistakes they made would mostly be
due to having trouble with the new notation. He compared the
scores of the first, unspaced test to the scores of the spaced test and
13
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found that indeed, students did much better when the notation was
spaced. Since the only difference between the two was the spacing,
it had to be the spacing itself which made their scores go up.14 This
spacing, which is reflective of the order of operations, does seem
to inform our calculations. It is not irrelevant.
David Landy did a series of experiments to follow through
on these findings. In his first experiment, he tested how well
people could judge the truth of a statement when the spacing of it
was inconsistent (meaning, when the statement did not follow the
Rule of Spacing). So he asked people (in his case, college
students), whether a series of statements were true or false. Some
were consistent (i.e., does ―axb + cxd‖ necessarily equal ―cxd +
axb‖? For which the answer is yes), and some were inconsistent
(i.e., does ―a+b x c+d‖ necessarily equal ―c+d x a+b‖? For
which the answer is no). He found that people made six times as
many errors when the spacing was inconsistent.15 Inconsistent
spacing apparently interferes with people‘s ability to judge the
truth of a statement.
Next, Landy tested whether people really do consistently
add these spacings to statements when they write or type them out.
First he wrote out formulas in words (so, ―one plus one equals
two‖) and asked his participants to write the same formula out in
symbols (―1+1=2‖). He found that people did indeed place
multiplied items closer together than added items.16 Thinking
perhaps this was a quirk of handwriting having something to do
with the length of time it takes a person to think about the formula
14
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(meaning perhaps the gaps were due to a pause in thought), he
tested whether the same would happen when typing on a computer.
This time, participants were asked to convert English sentences
into logical symbols (―if Jack is happy, then Jill is happy‖ would
then become ―A → B‖). Again, however, people left spaces
between groups reflective of the order of operations. So the
spacing was present whether the formal sentences were
handwritten or typed.17
Lastly, Landy tested how spacing affects people's ability to
correctly solve formulae. First he had them solve simple
expressions with just one operator – so, 1+1, or 2x3. Again, these
were either consistently or inconsistently spaced. He found that the
spacing mattered mainly for addition. For formulae where addition
was the operator, when the spacing was wider than normal
participants tended to overestimate, but when the spacing was
narrow, they tended to underestimate (Proximity, 13). The last
experiment involved compound computations, with more than one
operator (i.e. 1+2x3=7). He found that inconsistent spacing led to
errors in selecting the correct operation – operands placed closer
together tended to be multiplied and operands placed farther apart
tended to be added regardless of what the operator actually was.18
Landy proposed hypotheses to explain these phenomena
beyond simply ascribing it to reflecting the order of operations. He
wanted to say that this is not just a representation of the rule itself,
but rather a spatial reflection of the cognitive processes that we use
17
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to follow the rule. For the simple expressions, he proposed what he
called the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis. He speculated that we all
have a ―mental number line‖ in our heads and when we do addition
(but not multiplication), we start at the first number and ―move‖
ourselves along the line the required number of steps and then see
where we end up.19 So for 1+1=2, I would start at one on my
mental number line and then take one step forward. I see that I
landed at two, and therefore know that the answer is two. But when
spacing is abnormally wide or narrow, it influences my perception
of the question so that I overestimate or underestimate the correct
response, respectively. Thus the spacing of the formula on the page
is a visual representation of the act of walking along my mental
number line.
For the compound expressions, Landy offers a somewhat
more subtle explanation. He claims that when terms are grouped
closer together, it is a spatial representation of how syntactically
bound together they are (I shall call this the ―syntax‖ hypothesis).
―...if, as we suggest, understanding formal symbol structures
typically involves spatial resources, then symbolic productions
might be expected to reflect syntactic structure: The less tightly
two adjacent terms are bound syntactically, the farther apart they
should be placed physically.‖ 20 In the expression 1+2x3, 2 and 3
are more tightly syntactically bound than 2 and 1, so I place 2
closer to 3 than to 1 as a visual representation of that tightness.

19
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The Rule of Spacing and the Principle of Maximal Scope
If these are in fact diagrammatic elements in our formal
representation, we have to ask what this shows. We have striven to
remove diagrams from our computations and proofs because
historically, diagrams were meant to represent contingent objects,
relations, etc. Because they are contingent, they cannot follow the
principle of maximal scope, which means whenever possible we
should avoid them in order to keep our math and logic as broad as
is possible. The other problem with the Rule of Spacing is that they
seem to represent, according to Landy's hypotheses, our cognitive
processes. We have tried hard to remove any psychological factors
from math and logic, because, again, we do not want math or logic
to be contingent on the human mind. Theoretically, another species
ought to be able to use logic exactly the way we do. It ought not to
work only for human beings.
However, we cannot just reject the Rule of Spacing solely
because it is diagrammatic. We need to ask whether this is indeed a
weakness, whether it does fall prey to the above problems. I argue
that if these tendencies are diagrammatic, they do in fact still
follow the principle of maximal scope exactly the same way that
any arbitrary, formal representation would, and thus are not in fact
a problem we ought to eliminate. These diagrams are of a different
sort than, say, a drawing of a triangle. Yes, they are a reflection of
the cognitive processes we use to solve equations, but so is the plus
sign or the equals sign. These things are symbolic ways of
communicating the steps we take to solve an equation, and if they
are standardized, the way the equals sign is, we eliminate most the
problems psychological interference might cause. They are not
representations of contingent, extensional objects or relations in
174

the material world like our diagrams in cartography were. So while
we have diagrammatic elements in our formal representations, it is
not problematic in the same way.
Why the Rule of Spacing Does Not Yield Diagrams
I do not, however, fully support the idea that these are
diagrammatic elements – specifically because of the differences
between them and conventional diagrams mentioned above.
Certainly they are visual and imagistic. But not all images are
necessarily diagrams – all of our arbitrary symbols we use in
formal notations are also imagistic in that they communicate their
information visually. The distinction we have made is that
diagrams are direct and intrinsic. For the ―longer is larger‖
hypothesis, there could be ways to directly represent that. If we do
perform addition by walking a ―mental number line‖, a direct
representation of this would involve making the spaces between
symbols bigger for formulas in which the numbers involved are
bigger; so we might have 1+1=2, and 3 + 5 = 8. This is a
direct representation of our mental number line: we have to go
further down it to get to 8 than we do to get to 2, so the formula
directly represents this by spacing the numbers farther apart.
But this is not what Landy shown. In fact, what he has
shown is the exact opposite. He proved that there is a common
distance we put between the symbols, and that when that distance
is inconsistent, it throws us off and we come up with the wrong
answer. This may be proof that we are walking a mental number
line and that that is how we do addition, but it is not proof that the
Rule of Spacing is diagrammatic. We have a consistent distance,
and any deviation from that distance is problematic. So while the
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spatial relations of the symbols on the page are important, they are
not any sort of direct representation, and thus are not
diagrammatic.
For the ―syntax‖ hypothesis, there is more of a sense in
which the spatial relationships Landy found are direct. We are
saying that two terms are closer together syntactically, and so we
place them physically closer together on the page. This seems like
a direct representation, or at least, it certainly does not seem
arbitrary. However, the idea of two things being ―more tightly
syntactically bound‖21 is not a reference to a spatial relationship in
the first place. The word ―close‖ is misleading – we are referring
here to a different kind of closeness. Saying two things are closer
syntactically is different than saying Minneapolis is closer to
Chicago than to Paris. There is no real physical distance involved
in syntax, and there never could be, because syntax is not a
physical object to begin with.
What do we mean by ―syntactic closeness‖, then? We may
say that being ―more tightly bound‖ is referring to temporal
distance, in that the terms are more tightly bound because they are
dealt with first and are therefore temporally closer together
(―tighter‖), but then we are right back to referring directly to the
order of operations. They are only temporally closer together
because the rule of the order of operations says they should be, and
if these spacings are only reflective of our rule, then they are most
certainly not diagrammatic, unless we want to say that parentheses
(which are also only reflective of the order of operations) are also
diagrammatic. The spacing would then only be an arbitrary symbol
21
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of the rule, the same way that addition and multiplication symbols
are arbitrary symbols of their own respective rules. If we think
about the order of operations and what it actually says, there is
nothing about physical closeness that directly implies it the way
saying a diagram represents that line A is shorter than line B
because I have physically drawn line A shorter than line B. The
Rule of Spacing, as a representation of the order of operations, is
intuitively helpful, but not intrinsic. Again, for these spacings to be
diagrammatic and not merely imagistic, they have to represent
something in a direct way, and for these reasons if they are only
representative of the order of operations, they do not.
Taking a step back, we have to further note that Landy has
not in fact proved either the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis or the
―syntax‖ hypothesis. He has shown that the spatial relationships
between the symbols on the page affect the way we compute
formulae. He has not shown why this is the case – that would
require a whole different type of experiment. These two
hypotheses might be plausible explanations, but they have not yet
been proven or even strongly supported. Perhaps the Rule of
Spacing is only a symbol of the order of operations, and thus
arbitrary. Perhaps it is not indicative of some deeper cognitive
process. Again, we use parentheses in algebra to help us follow the
order of operations, and we do not consider those to be
diagrammatic, even though they (like any other symbol, even the
numbers) are visual.
The underlying point here is that just because something is
visual does not mean it is diagrammatic. The requirement for
something to be diagrammatic, by Landy's own standards, is that it
is direct and intrinsic. In order for him to support his claim that
177

there are diagrammatic elements to formal representations, he
needs not only to prove that the way symbols are arranged on the
page affects the way we think, but also that the spatial relations
involved are direct representations and not merely arbitrary
symbols. Without this second step, all he has shown is that
formulae are imagistic and that there is an aspect of that trait that
affects the way we compute that we have not yet acknowledged.
The Import of the Data
I am not, however, dismissing the findings of Kirshner and
Landy as insignificant. I believe it is still highly important to
examine what their results mean. The issue I see for the disciplines
of mathematics and logic is not that we have diagrams in our
formal representations, but rather that we have implicit rules at
play. It seems that an undiscussed rule has developed and been
passed from teacher to student, and that it is powerful enough to
cause people to make computational errors when it is disobeyed.
Why the rule developed in the first place, which is what Landy is
discussing with his two hypotheses, is an important and interesting
question, but not necessarily relevant to mathematicians, logicians
or philosophers. For those disciplines, the fact that the rule exists is
the crux of the issue.
There are two ways we may address the Rule of Spacing:
We may either actively suppress it, which requires explicit
discussion of its existence and then for teachers to make certain
they are not subconsciously passing it on to their students; or it
needs to be defined and standardized, the same as the rule of
addition or the order of operations. Without doing either of these,
our psychological processes are interfering with our computations
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in exactly the way we fear. The math or logic we do is being
influenced by subconscious mental processes, and there may be
differences in this from person to person. Perhaps what is ―close
together‖ or ―far apart‖ for one person is different for another, and
so when that first person writes out a formula in what they think is
consistent with the Rule of Spacing, it is inconsistent for the
second person, causing them to make a computational error. But if
we make the rule explicit, perhaps standardize the distances
between operands and particular operators, then this would
hopefully minimize the interference of our own subjective
psychologies.
There are, as Landy points out22, a number of benefits to
this rule, such that perhaps we ought not to bemoan its presence.
The fact of the matter is that we are not purely linguistic beings.
We also necessarily process information through our senses, since
that is how we acquire it. This is unavoidable. For the purposes of
written logic and mathematics, this means we process the
information visually as well as linguistically. So incorporating
visual elements into our rules might make it easier for us to process
the information we are trying to convey. Particularly, when we first
teach a student arithmetic, making the order of operations a spatial
as well as a syntactic rule might make it easier to remember and
follow. This would minimize the number of mistakes we make
when computing formulae and help us learn faster.
In fact, the rule could be helpful for teachers as well as
students.23 If we had such a visual rule representing the steps we

22
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took to compute a formula, a teacher could more easily see why a
student got the wrong answer on a test or assignment. If a student
writes 2 x 2+3=10, it is most likely that he or she did not follow
the order of operations correctly and thus the teacher can much
more easily correct and instruct him or her. On the other hand, if
the student writes 2x2 + 3=10, it is of course still possible that he
or she does not understand the rule of operations, but it is also
more possible that there is some other error responsible. Basically,
this visual rule is a way of representing the steps we took to solve
an equation, the same way we use parentheses. So, it can
communicate more efficiently to a teacher whether a student
correctly understands the rule.
Conclusion
For many years, logicians and mathematicians have worked
to remove diagrams from logical proofs and formulae for the
reason that diagrams, due to the nature of their origins, do not
follow the principle of maximal scope. We have drawn a strict
distinction between diagrams, which are intrinsic and direct, and
formal representations, which are extrinsic and indirect, or
arbitrary. Kirshner and Landy, among others, have rather
convincingly shown, however, that there are relevant spatial
relationships to our formal representations – mainly, we tend to
spatially represent the order of operations by placing physically
closer together those operations which ought to be performed first.
Landy explains these tendencies using what he calls the ―longer is
larger‖ hypothesis in simple expressions, and what I have called
the ―syntax‖ hypothesis in compound expressions. Because these
spatial relationships so strongly affect the way we compute, Landy
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claims they are diagrammatic.
I argue that if this were so, these diagrammatic elements
would in fact follow the principle of maximal scope and therefore
not be a problem the way a diagram of a triangle, for instance, is. I
further argue, however, that even though the Rule of Spacing is
visual and imagistic, it is not diagrammatic because the way it
represents the information it is conveying is not direct or intrinsic.
Regardless, the Rule of Spacing is currently an unacknowledged
rule affecting the way we compute, which is problematic and needs
to be addressed.
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